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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Valentino Herrera appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Herrera was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer and the
Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on appeal. State v. Herrera, 152
Idaho 24, 266 P.3d 499 (Ct. App. 2011 ).

Herrera thereafter filed a petition for

post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 6-21.) Relevant to this appeal, Herrera asserted a
claim of denial of counsel because he "never has [sic] counsel until his
preliminary hearing" (R., pp. 8-9) and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
because counsel did not move to suppress his statements (R., p. 9), did not
move to continue the trial (R., p. 10), did not move for a change of venue (R., p.
12), inadequately prepared for trial (R., p. 12), and did not adequately crossexamine state witnesses (R., p. 16).

The state filed an answer to Herrera's

petition. (R., pp. 2426-28.)
The state also filed a motion for summary dismissal of the petition. (R.,
pp. 4, 2548-78.) Herrera responded. (R., pp. 2582-05, 2607-15.) The district
court granted the motion. (R., pp. 2627-61.) It concluded the claim that Herrera
was denied counsel was "bare, conclusory, and disproven by the record in the
underlying case."

(R., p. 2630.)

It also dismissed the claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel relevant to this appeal as "bare and conclusory." (R., pp.

1

2632-38.) Herrera filed a notice of appeal timely from entry of judgment. (R., pp.
2663, 2665.)

2

ISSUES
Herrera states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied
post conviction [sic] relief on the claim that Defendant [sic]
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his
attorney was totally absent during a critical stage of the
proceedings[.]

II.

Whether the district court erred when. it summarily dismissed
specific claims in the petition for post-conviction relief[.]

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Herrera failed to show that the district court erred by denying his
claim that he was denied counsel at a critical stage of the criminal case
because that claim is disproved by the record and is legally without merit?

2.

Has Herrera failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel during the course of trial proceedings
because those claims were unsupported by law or evidence?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Herrera Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His Claim
That He Was Denied Counsel At A Critical Stage Of The Criminal Case
A.

Introduction
The district court dismissed Herrera's claim that he "never had counsel"

until his preliminary hearing as "bare, conclusory, and disproven by the record in
the underlying case." (R., p. 2630.) The record showed Herrera "had a courtappointed attorney at the inception of the underlying case and at all other
relevant times." (Id.)
On appeal Herrera asserts the district court "misunderstands this claim"
because he was "actually asserting" that "counsel was not actually present with
Mr. Herrera" at the August 3, 2006 arraignment. (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Herrera
makes this claim without citation to the record and provides no analysis based on
the words used in his petition.

Herrera then argues that an arraignment is

automatically a "critical stage" at which counsel's absence is automatically
reversible error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-12.) This argument is based on a legal
claim that is at best sophistry, and at worst highly misleading. Application of the
law to the record in this case shows that Herrera's appellate claim is meritless.

B.

Standard Of Review
When this Court reviews a district court's summary dismissal
of a post-conviction petition without a hearing, this Court must
determine whether the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and
affidavits on file create a genuine issue of fact.
Where the
evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a
jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate,
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court

4

alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those
inferences. Moreover, the trial judge is not constrained to draw
inferences in favor of the party opposing a summary judgment
motion. Instead, the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable
inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.
Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, _ , 348 P.3d 145, 151 (2015) (internal cites
and quotations omitted).

C.

Herrera's Attempt To Amend His Petition On Appeal Should Be Rejected
On appeal Herrera asserts the district court "misunderstands" his claim

that he did not have counsel because he was "actually asserting" that "counsel
was not actually present with Mr. Herrera" at the August 3, 2006 arraignment.
(Appellant's brief, p. 8. 1) Herrera makes this claim without citation to the record
and provides no analysis based on the words used in his petition. Review of the
language of the petition shows that Herrera's claim is meritless.
The district court characterized this claim as alleging Herrera "did not have
an attorney in the underlying case until June 30, 2006, the date his preliminary
hearing was first scheduled to take place." (R., p. 2630.) This is consistent with
the actual language in the claim, which reads, in its entirety, as follows:
A.) ARRAIGNMENT Proceeding; CLAIM:
An arraignment is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding which
the accused under federal constitution law is entitled to counsel and
if the accused is without at the arraignment he may obtain relief
from his conviction without showing that he suffered a disadvantage
from such a denial.

The district court's understanding of the claim matches arguments regarding the
claim Herrera asserted below. (R., pp. 2595-96.) Herrera apparently failed to
understand his own claims until this appeal.
1
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Petitioner's never has counsel until his preliminary hearing on
June 30, 2006. And at that time he was, he receives a conflict
attorney, who advised petitioner to wave, a timely preliminary
hearing. So new counsel could investigate and prepare for
petitioner's, rescheduled preliminary hearing, which was reset for
July 14, 2006.
Petitioner's asks this Honorable Court to remember that counsel
has only spoken with him about this criminal case, maybe (15)
fifteenth minutes and that is with only new counsel, his only
counsel. It had been (40) days since the alleged fight at the MiniCassia County Jail. Please see exhibit: (a) (a-2) (a-3) (a-4) (a-5)
and (a-6) and there is genuine issue of material fact and if this
claim is proven true it shall demand relief.

(R., pp. 8-9 (verbatim).)
Herrera has not pointed out (nor can he) what language in this count
indicates that he is claiming that he was deprived of the right to counsel by
counsel's apparent absence from the August 3, 2006 arraignment. On appeal he
relies entirely upon Exhibit A-7 to make his argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9
(quoting R., pp. 34-35).) There is, however, no reference to Exhibit A-7 in the
claim and no factual assertion that counsel was ineffective in relation to the
August 3, 2006 arraignment. See I.C. § 19-4903 (petition shall "specifically set
forth the grounds upon which the application is based"). Herrera's claim that the
district court "misunderstands" his claim is baseless, because the district court,
as opposed to Herrera on appeal, actually relied upon the language of the claim.

D.

Herrera Failed To Show That The August 3, 2006 Arraignment Was A
"Critical Stage" Of The Criminal Proceedings
Even if Herrera's claim was that he was denied counsel because counsel

was absent at the August 3, 2006 arraignment his claim was properly dismissed
as "bare, conclusory, and disproven by the record." (R., p. 2630.)

6

Normally a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show
both deficient performance and prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687-88 (1984); Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 713, 274 P.3d 11, 14 (Ct.
App. 2012).

There are limited circumstances, however, where "prejudice from

ineffective assistance may be presumed." Zepeda, 152 Idaho at 713, 274 P .3d
at 14 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-62 (1984)).

Such

circumstances include "where there is a 'complete denial' of counsel at a critical
stage of trial."

&

(quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658) (emphasis added). "[T]he

presumption of prejudice generally is employed only to address "circumstances
that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect is
unjustified."

&

(quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658).

Herrera has provided no justification for employing the presumption of
prejudice in this case. The minutes of the August 3, 2006 arraignment, while
they do indicate that defense counsel was not present, also indicate that the
court informed Herrera of the plea options available; explained his rights;
explained what rights would be given up by entering a guilty plea; provided
Herrera a copy of the information; confirmed that Herrera's name on the
information was accurate; advised Herrera of the penalties; and set the matter
over for entry of plea.

(R., pp. 34-35.) The only right Herrera actually waived

was his right to a reading of the information. (R., p. 34.) There is no reason to
believe that waiver of the right to a reading of the information was prejudicial to
Herrera's trial.

7

Rather than create a situation where prejudice must be presumed, the
record establishes a situation where prejudice cannot be imagined.
Herrera argues that the Supreme Court of the United States has applied
the Cronic rule to the absence of counsel at an arraignment. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 10-11.) For this argument he cites to language in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct.
1399, 1405 (2012), 2 which in turn cites to Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52
(1961 ). In Hamilton the Court found the arraignment in that capital case was a
"critical stage" because, under Alabama law, certain defenses and challenges to
grand jury proceedings had to be raised at the arraignment or they were forfeited.
Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 53-54. Thus, what happened at the arraignment in that
case "may affect the whole trial" because defenses could be "irretrievably lost."
~

at 54. An uncounseled arraignment thus presented "the same pitfalls" as an

uncounseled trial.

~

Thus, "'critical stages' include the pretrial type of

arraignment where certain rights may be sacrificed or lost."

Coleman v.

Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970) (emphasis added). 3
Unlike the situation in Hamilton, Herrera waived no defenses or potential
challenges to the prior proceedings at the arraignment. The arraignment without

Counsel's claim that the Court in ~ "confirmed what Cronic noted" and is
"controlling caselaw" (Appellant's brief, p. 11) is highly misleading. The Frye
court applied the Strickland test to attorney conduct in plea negotiations and did
not even mention Cronic.
2

The Supreme Court has distinguished between arraignments that "signal[] the
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings" and those that constitute "a critical
stage requiring the presence of counsel." Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex.,
554 U.S. 191 (2008). It makes no sense, for example, to say that not having
counsel at an arraignment where a defendant was notified and first asserted the
right to counsel constitutes Cronic error.
3
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the physical presence of counsel had no possible effect on the fairness of the
trial.

Herrera has therefore failed to show that the arraignment in his criminal

case was a critical stage requiring presence such that prejudice must be
presumed.

11.
Herrera Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Dismissal Of Claims Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel During The Course Of Trial Proceedings
A.

Introduction
The district court dismissed several other claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel because the allegations supporting them were "bare and conclusory."
(R., pp. 2632-38.)

Contrary to Herrera's arguments on appeal, the record and

the applicable law support the district court's rulings.

B.

Standard Of Review
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).

C.

Herrera's Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Were Properly
Dismissed Because They Were Unsupported By Evidence Of Both
Deficient Performance And Prejudice
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must

demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

9

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).
An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable .... " Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174,
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App.
1999).
Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not
make a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. State,
125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). The court is not required
to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135
Idaho 797,799, 25 P.3d 110,112 (2001).
Review of the record shows that the district court correctly concluded that
Herrera's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were bare assertions

10

unsupported by specific facts and conclusory allegations unsupported by
admissible evidence or applicable law.

1.

Herrera's Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Filing A
Motion To Suppress Was Unsupported By Evidence

The district court concluded that Herrera's claim that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his statements based on an
alleged Miranda 4 violation was bare and conclusory. (R., pp. 2632-33.) Review
of the applicable law and record support this conclusion.
Whether to file a motion to suppress is a strategic decision, based at least
in part on the "probability of success of such a motion." Ray v. State, 133 Idaho
96, 102, 982 P.2d 931 (1999).

To be entitled to suppression for a Miranda

violation, the defendant must show that he was subjected to custodial
interrogation without the benefit of the Miranda warnings. State v. Loosli, 130
Idaho 398, 399, 941 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1996).

Although statements taken in

violation of Miranda may not be used in the state's case-in-chief, they are
admissible to impeach a defendant's testimony.
222, 225-26 (1971 ).

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.

The defendant has the "ultimate authority" to decide

whether he will "testify on his or her own behalf." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,
751 (1983).

Thus, completely keeping the statements Herrera made from the

jury would have required both proof of a Miranda violation (which would have
kept the statements out of the state's case-in-chief) and Herrera's own election to

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring warnings related to certain
rights prior to custodial interrogation).

4
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waive his right to testify (which would have kept the statements out as
impeachment).
The record shows that Herrera did exercise his right to testify at trial (see,

~ ' R., p. 16 (alleging that Herrera was a "key witness[]"), and Herrera does not
claim he was misinformed of his rights in making that decision.

Thus, the

strategic choice faced by counsel was whether to file a motion to keep the
evidence of Herrera's statements out of the state's case-in-chief knowing that the

evidence would come in as impeachment evidence.

Herrera presented no

evidence that this strategic choice was based on any objective shortcoming such
as ignorance of the law or inadequate preparation.
Moreover, because the evidence of the statements was admissible as
impeachment evidence the prejudice inquiry is whether keeping the evidence out
of the state's case-in-chief, but admitting it as impeachment evidence, was likely
to have affected the outcome of the trial. Herrera presented nothing indicating
that the form or purpose of admission of the evidence could or would have
affected the jury's verdict.
Application of the relevant law to the record in this case shows that the
district court properly dismissed this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as
bare and conclusory.

Because the evidence in question would have been

admissible as impeachment, whether to bring the motion to suppress, even
assuming it would have been successful, was very much a tactical decision that
Herrera failed to show was unreasonable. Moreover, because the evidence was

12

admissible for impeachment regardless of the success of the motion, Herrera has
failed to present a prima facie claim of prejudice.
On appeal Herrera faults the district court for relying on the lack of
evidence showing that counsel failed to consult with Herrera or that Herrera
desired to pursue suppression, claiming the district court was "turning the
attorney-client relationship on its head." (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14. 5) As the
applicable law set forth above makes clear, however, keeping evidence of
Herrera's statements to police out of the trial ultimately depended on Herrera
choosing to waive his right to testify.

Thus, consultation with Herrera and

Herrera's election would have been central to any strategic decision regarding
whether to pursue the motion to suppress. Herrera's claims otherwise are simply
unsupported by relevant law.
Herrera has failed to show that the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to
suppress based on an alleged Miranda violation. Application of the law to the

On appeal Herrera relies primarily on Exhibit E-4 as demonstrating that the
district court ignored evidence that a motion to suppress would have succeeded.
(Appellant's brief, p. 14 (citing R., pp. 82-84).) Exhibit E-4 was not submitted in
support of this claim, however. (R., p. 9 (submitting exhibits (b), (b-1), (b-2) and
(aa) in support of Claim B).) Because Herrera is relying on evidence never
submitted in support of this claim, he has failed to show error based on the
evidence actually submitted. In addition, in Howes v. Fields, _
U.S. _ , 132
S.Ct. 1181 (2012), the Supreme Court of the United States held that asking
questions of an inmate is not necessarily a custodial interrogation pursuant to
Miranda. Herrera presented no evidence establishing a custodial interrogation
under Howes. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 15-17 (repeatedly admitting a lack of
evidence showing whether factors present in Howes were present in this case
and including no citations to the record supporting the factual claims trying to
distinguish this case from Howes).)
5
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record shows that Herrera failed to present a prima facie claim of either deficient
performance or prejudice.

2.

Herrera's Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Filing For A
Continuance Was Unsupported By Evidence

The prosecution filed an amended information adding a persistent violator
enhancement three months before trial, but did not move for court permission to
amend until the first day of trial. Herrera, 152 Idaho at 30-31, 266 P.3d at 50506.

The court arraigned Herrera on the enhancement at that time.

&

On

appeal the Idaho Court of Appeals found no error (because no prejudice) in the
timing of the amendment or the additional arraignment.

&

One of the grounds

for the Court of Appeals' ruling was that "Herrera's claim that he had no
opportunity to engage in plea negotiations while being aware of the persistent
violator enhancement is disproven by his own statement at his first sentencing
hearing."

&

at 31, 266 P.3d at 506.

In his petition, Herrera alleged that "[c]ounsel needed to file a continuance
to insure that the petitioner understood the sentencing of what the enhancement
(persistent violator) had if found guilty, and also of the plea the State was
offering, because it could mean a life sentence if he did not take it." (R., p. 10
(verbatim).)

The district court granted summary dismissal because this claim

was "bare and conclusory," citing no admissible evidence that "a continuance
was necessary for [Herrera] to understand the effect of the enhancement," that a
continuance would have been granted, or that Herrera suffered any prejudice.
(R., p. 2633.)

14

The district court was correct. There is no evidence that Herrera needed
more time to understand the effect of the enhancement, no evidence that the
court would have granted a continuance for that purpose, and, finally, no
evidence that Herrera would in fact have pied guilty.

As such, there is no

evidence that counsel's performance was deficient or that Herrera was
prejudiced.
Herrera argues that there was evidence of all these things. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 22-36.) Review of the record shows this argument to be without merit.
There is no evidence that Herrera in fact needed more time to understand
the alleged plea offer by the state. 6 According to Herrera's affidavit, his counsel
told him at 3:30 the day before trial that the state had extended a plea offer.
(Augmentation,

~

26.) The terms of the offer were that if Herrera pied guilty the

state would not file the persistent violator enhancement and would recommend a
sentence of three years with one year determinate.

(Id.) Thus, according to

Herrera's own pleading, he knew for approximately 18 hours that the state had
offered a specific sentencing recommendation significantly less than the five-year
maximum he faced upon conviction without the enhancement, and that if he pied
guilty the state would not seek an enhancement that would increase the five year
maximum. Thus, Herrera had several hours to contemplate entering a plea that

Herrera failed to present admissible evidence that there was in fact a plea offer
extended by the state. He included in his affidavit a claim that his attorney told
him there had been a plea offer (Augmentation, ~ 26), but Herrera's statement
regarding what his attorney said is hearsay if admitted to prove that a plea offer
had in fact been made and what its terms were. I.R.E. 801.
6
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would avoid a sentence of an unspecific amount more than five years but chose
not to take that agreement.
According to Herrera he was shocked to learn the next day (the first day of
trial) that the enhancement would require a sentence from five years to life. (Id.,

,I 30.) Thereafter he told "Rosa" that "they want to give me a life sentence" and
she advised him to "take the deal" to avoid that.

(Id., ,I 31.)

Herrera's own

evidence thus establishes that he understood the exact scope of the state's
alleged plea offer, consulted with someone close to him (perhaps a wife or
girlfriend) who advised him to take the offer, but he did not take it.
The district court correctly concluded that this evidence does not establish
that Herrera needed more time to understand the alleged plea offer as he
claimed in his petition. Herrera had several hours, at least, to contemplate the
advantages and disadvantages of accepting or rejecting the alleged plea offer
while understanding that if he declined the offer the state would file a sentencing
enhancement.

After being informed the exact length of the enhancement

Herrera discussed the plea agreement with, and was counselled to take it by,
someone close to him, but he still did not accept the alleged plea offer.

The

district court correctly concluded that Herrera presented no evidence that he
needed more time to understand the nature of the alleged plea offer. His own
affidavit shows he understood the offer because he discussed it with his counsel
and with "Rosa."

Herrera understood the agreement, and rejected it, and the

claim that his counsel provided deficient performance by not seeking more time
to allow Herrera to change his mind is without merit.
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Likewise, there is nothing in this record showing a continuance would
have been granted.

Thus, not asking for a continuance was not deficient

performance and he suffered no prejudice from failing to seek a continuance.
Herrera apparently acknowledges that this is true in relation to a discretionary
continuance, but asserts counsel should have sought a continuance of up to
three days under I.C.R. 10 and I.C. § 19-1908, which the district court had no
discretion to deny. (Appellant's brief, pp. 28-29.) This argument is without merit.

A defendant is entitled to an arraignment "[a]fter an indictment or
information has been filed with the district court." I.C.R. 10(a). A defendant who
"requires time to enter a plea ... must be allowed a reasonable time, not less
than one day, within which to answer the indictment or information." I.C.R. 1O(c)
(emphasis added).

Likewise, a defendant is entitled to not less than two days

"[a]fter his plea" to prepare for trial.

I.C. § 19-1908.

It is well established,

however, that a new arraignment and guilty plea is not required after an
amendment to a charging document.
P.2d 282 (1941 ).

E.fL,

State v. Barr, 63 Idaho 59, _ , 117

Moreover, enhancements are not elements of the charged

crime. State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 492, 337 P.3d 647, 651 (2014) (defendant
not entitled to have enhancement considered at preliminary hearing). That the
district court chose to re-arraign Herrera and take a new plea for just the added
enhancement did not make the cited provisions of I.C.R. 10 or I.C. § 19-1908
applicable, much less mandatory.
Finally, even if Herrera had provided evidence of deficient performance he
failed to present any evidence of prejudice. Herrera first argues that he does not

17

need any evidence because "the only reasonable, logical and intelligent thing to
do" when the state offers to dismiss a persistent violator enhancement is to plead
guilty to the underlying offense. (Appellant's brief, p. 34.) This argument bears
no correlation to the law or reality. Herrera is not the first defendant to reject an
offer to dismiss or not file a persistent violator enhancement in exchange for a
guilty plea to the underlying crime, nor will he be the last, and any defendant
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must prove with evidence that the
reason he rejected the offer was his attorney's deficient performance.
On appeal Herrera claims that the evidence that he would have taken the
plea offer had he been given a little more time to consider it can be found on
page 11 of his affidavit and on pages 970-71 of the record. (Appellant's brief, pp.
35-36.) Page 11 of the affidavit describes a conversation he had with different
counsel 14 months after trial. (Augmentation,

,r 68.)

Pages 970-71 of the record

are an excerpt of a transcript containing statements made by Herrera 20 months

after the trial. (R., pp. 970-71.) Evidence that Herrera came to regret his choice
months after he was convicted is hardly evidence that he would have accepted
the plea offer but for counsel's failure to move for three additional days before
trial to think about it.
Herrera has failed to show error in the district court's determination he did
not present evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for not asking for a continuance.

Herrera presented no

evidence that he needed more time to understand the alleged plea offer (to the
contrary, his affidavit establishes that he understood the alleged offer).
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His

claims that a continuance would have been granted are dubious.

Finally, he

failed to present any evidence of prejudice. He has therefore failed to show that
the summary dismissal of this claim was erroneous.

3.

Herrera's Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Filing For A
Change Of Venue Was Unsupported By Evidence

Herrera claimed it was ineffective for counsel to not move "to have a jury
pulled from a couple county away" because the judges, prosecutors and police
all knew the complaining witness.

(R., p. 12 (verbatim).)

The district court

concluded there was no evidence supporting the claim for three reasons.
"Regardless of whether judges, court staff and law enforcement officers knew Mr.
Garrett, Mr. Herrera has not provided admissible evidence [1] to show that he did
not receive a fair trial due to juror exposure to pretrial publicity, [2] that a motion
for a change of venue would have been granted in the court's discretion, or [3]
that conducting the trial in a different venue would have resulted in a different
outcome to the proceedings in the underlying case."
numbering added).)

(R., p. 2636 (bracketed

Herrera claims the court erred by addressing pre-trial

publicity, which was not part of his claim. (Appellant's brief, pp. 41-43.) Because
Herrera does not challenge the district court's conclusion that he failed to present
evidence that a change of venue motion would have been granted or that a
change of venue would have changed the outcome of the trial, he has failed to
show error. Brown v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156,165,335 P.3d 1, 10 (2014) ("It
is well settled that where a trial court grants summary judgment on two
independent grounds and the appellant challenges only one of those grounds on
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appeal, the judgment must be affirmed."

(quotations, citations, and brackets

omitted)). The district court must be affirmed on the bases for dismissing the
claim that Herrera does not challenge on appeal.

4.

Herrera's Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective In His Trial
Preparation Was Unsupported By Evidence

Herrera claimed counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial. (R., p. 12.)
The district court concluded

that Herrera's allegations were

"bare and

conclusory" because unsupported by evidence. (R., pp. 2637-38.) The record
contains no evidence of what counsel did or did not do to prepare for trial, and
Herrera has not cited any such evidence on this appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.
43-4 7.) Herrera has therefore failed to show error.

5.

Herrera's Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective In How He
Impeached State's Witnesses Was Unsupported By Evidence

Herrera claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to "properly crossexamine state witnesses [and] impeach state witnesses with prior inconsistent
statements." (R., pp. 12, 16.) The district court concluded Herrera's claim was
"bare and conclusory" because he presented no "admissible evidence" that
decisions on how to cross-examine were based on mistakes of law or inadequate
preparation; "to show how the State's witnesses should have been crossexamined and impeached"; or showing how different impeachment would have
resulted in a different outcome. (R., p. 2637.)
Herrera does not challenge most of this ruling on appeal.

He does,

however, claim there was sufficient evidence to show counsel was ineffective in
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cross-examining Garrett (the victim) about the number of doctor visits regarding
the injury inflicted by Herrera, cross-examining Garrett on the number of prior
felonies he had been convicted of, and cross-examining Garrett and Galow (an
inmate witness) regarding the nature of Garrett's injuries. (Appellant's brief, pp.
20-21, 38, 45.) None of these arguments is supported by evidence.
Herrera presented evidence that Garrett testified at trial that he went to the
hospital "three times in the next three days for treatment." (R., p. 328 (Trial Tr.,
p. 56, Ls. 4-6).) He also presented a fax from the jail to the prosecutor's office
with two medical bills from the hospital attached, showing treatment on June 5
and 6, 2006.

(R., pp. 329-31.)

This evidence does not show how cross-

examination was even possible, much less that failure to cross-examine on this
matter was an objectively unreasonable tactical decision that prejudiced Herrera.
On appeal in the criminal case, Herrera argued that the prosecutor was
wrong to argue that Garrett had been convicted of only a single felony because
there was an apparently contradictory statement in the preliminary hearing.
Herrera, 152 Idaho at 32, 266 P.3d at 507. The Court of Appeals rejected this
argument, in part, because the record did not show how many felonies Garrett
had been convicted of. ~ at 33, 266 P.3d at 508. Herrera acknowledges that
he submitted "no additional information," but argues it was the state's burden to
disprove his claim. (Appellant's brief, p. 38.) This argument is specious.
Finally, Herrera argues that his trial attorney should have impeached
Garrett's and Galow's testimony that Garret was having trouble seeing with
evidence that Garrett wrote a statement that was "pretty legible and easy to
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read." (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-20 (citing R., pp. 328, 333-34, 356, 360).) This
argument relies entirely on evidence actually presented at trial-Herrera has
failed to show that the manner of its presentation was somehow deficient
performance or prejudicial. In addition, the evidence that Garrett suffered an eye
injury that required medical treatment was unrefuted.

(See, ~ , R., p. 328;

Appellant's brief, p. 21 (Herrera "not claiming that nothing happened to Alan
Garrett's eye").) Herrera has failed to show that there was anything to be gained
by challenging Garrett's claim that he had trouble seeing, much less that failure
to do so amounted to deficient performance and prejudice.
Herrera has not shown that the district court erred when it found his claims
that counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when impeaching
prosecution witnesses were bare and conclusory.

6.

Herrera's Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Obiect
To Cross-Examination By The Prosecutor Was Unsupported By
Evidence

Herrera alleged his counsel was ineffective for failing to "object to
improper cross-examination by [the] prosecutor."

(R.,

p.

15.)

In his

accompanying brief Herrera clarified that he was claiming that counsel should
have objected to the prosecutor presenting evidence of the nature of one of his
three past felony convictions, rather than staying limited to the fact of three prior
convictions. (R., pp. 2375-76.) The district court concluded that this claim was
"bare and conclusory" because the evidence did not show that the prosecutor
admitted evidence of the nature of the felony conviction, and therefore Herrera
provided no "admissible evidence showing how the cross-examination questions
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at issue were improper in any way," showing that an objection would have been
sustained, or showing a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would
have been different. (R., p. 2642.)
On appeal Herrera claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to get
evidence of his three prior convictions excluded entirely and not objecting when
the prosecutor asked him if he believed other witnesses had lied.
brief, pp. 38-41, 45.7)

(Appellant's

Lacking from Herrera's argument is any claim that he

actually made these claims in his petition.

The Court must reject claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel made for the first time on appeal.

State v.

Martin, 119 Idaho 577,579,808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991); State v. Adams, 138
Idaho 624, 628, 67 P.3d 103, 107 (Ct. App. 2003).
Even if the claims had been raised in the petition, there is no evidence in
the record to support them. When expressing a lack of objection to evidence that
Herrera had three prior felony convictions, trial counsel stated that such evidence
was "in the same vain" as evidence of prior convictions used to impeach state's
witnesses.

(R., p. 196 (Tr., p. 145, Ls. 11-15).)

Herrera has utterly failed to

provide any context for the lack of objection, much less show that the decision to
not object was the result of an objective shortcoming.

On the contrary, the

evidence suggests that the lack of objection was a tactical choice made either
because the court had already ruled such evidence was proper impeachment or

It is unclear from Herrera's brief whether he is attempting to raise this issue as
an independent claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or is raising this as a
prejudice argument in relation to actually asserted claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp. 39-41.)
7
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because counsel made the tactical decision to let in evidence of prior convictions
of all witnesses. For example, Herrera argues evidence that he was convicted of
a felony should have been excluded where that felony was aggravated DUI, a
crime that does not indicate a lack of honesty.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 40-41.)

However, at trial, evidence that Garrett, the complaining witness, had been
convicted of felony DUI was admitted. Herrera, 152 Idaho at 32, 266 P.3d at
507.

Thus, asserting at trial that evidence of a felony DUI conviction was

inadmissible may have prevented the prosecution from impeaching Herrera, but
would also have prevented impeachment of the state's complaining witness.
Herrera's claim that the decision to not object was based on an objective
shortcoming is entirely speculative, as is his claim of prejudice.
Herrera also argues that counsel was ineffective for not objecting when
the prosecutor asked Herrera whether he thought other witnesses were lying.
(Appellant's brief, pp. 45-46. 8)

There is no evidence that counsel decided to

forgo objecting because he felt it was in his client's interests. Counsel could not
have elicited his client's opinion that the state's witnesses were lying, but that
does not mean he was not secretly pleased when the prosecutor did so.
On appeal Herrera does not challenge the dismissal of the claims he
actually made regarding ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting during

his cross-examination.

Therefore he has failed to show error in the district

court's ruling.

Herrera's counsel cites this as an "example of ineffective assistance of counsel"
without claiming it was alleged in the petition. (Appellant's brief, pp45-46.)
8
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 28th day of September, 2015.
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